BLAISE COSTABIR
Within weeks, three unrelated fires claimed dozens of lives—a pub in Bangkok, a coaching centre in Lucknow and the Birch by Romeo Lane nightclub in Goa. The loca tions were different, but the pattern was disturbingly fa miliar. People were trapped by inadequate exits, combus tible interiors, overcrowding and dense smoke that spread faster than the occupants could escape. In most cases, smoke proved deadlier than the flames. The Goa tragedy, in which twenty-five people lost their lives, is still before the courts. Criminal liability will ultimately be determined there. But regardless of the legal outcome, the disaster has once again exposed a deeper problem. Every ma jor fire prompts inquiries, inspections and promises of stricter enforcement. Yet once public attention fades, many of the same shortcom ings quietly return until the next avoidable tragedy.
If you enjoyed reading this article, you can help support our journalism by adding OHeraldo as a preferred source.
The real issue is not what caused these individual fires. It is why we continue to re peat the same mistakes de spite decades of painful les sons. Fire safety is not merely the responsibility of the Fire Services. It depends on three stakeholders working to gether—the regulator who sets and enforces standards, the owner who must design and operate safe premises, and the public that should demand safe buildings rath er than simply assume they are safe. Even if a fire had start ed despite all statutory ap provals, the real question is whether adequate exits, access roads, and fire protec tion would have prevented the loss of life. Buildings that cannot provide these essen tials should never receive permission to operate. When owners avoid the approval process altogether, they also avoid the scrutiny that could expose these deficiencies be fore tragedy strikes. The tragedies have once again drawn attention to recurring issues in our atti tude toward safety. The im mediate and usual response is to announce a high-level inquiry into the tragedy, con duct fire safety audits of sim ilar venues, and close several establishments found to be violating safety norms. The ground reality remains un changed.
In a few days, all will be forgotten, and we will be back to square one until the next tragedy. The bigger question that needs an answer is, are we going to learn from these unfortunate incidents that have claimed innocent lives? The regulator has now been swamped with applications, and so inspections now take three months instead of one; naturally, the Fire Services is short-staffed. The Fire Services should instead ask applicants to provide a compliance certifi cate stating that all mandato ry provisions of the National Building Code Standards (NBCS) 2026: Fire and Life Safety have been adhered to. False certification would ex pose designers and owners to legal liability and allow the Fire Service to focus on risk-based audits rather than checking every drawing. This will automatically force the builders to incor porate fire compliance into the building plan, rather than as an afterthought, when the department comes for in spection at the time of the final NOC. This would en courage builders to engage competent private fire-safety consultants during the design stage instead of treating com pliance as an afterthought. Empanelled experts should be avoided like the plague be cause past experience shows they are not effective, as they depend on the department to stay empanelled.
Large public assembly buildings—whether conven tion centers, casinos, malls, hospitals, or hotels—should visibly demonstrate safe evacuation systems. The proposed new casino also raises legitimate questions about how two thousand oc cupants would be evacuated rapidly during an emergen cy. Such questions deserve clear public answers before operations begin. They are governed by the Captain of Ports, with no expertise in the matter, and not by the Fire & Emergency Services, who will be the first to be notified in case of an emer gency. The second stakeholder is the owner; fire compliance is directly connected to cost. Unfortunately, given our lack of seriousness about safety, this cost is considered a bur den—something that can be managed. This has to change; fire compliance must be in corporated at the design stage, and this must be a sell ing point. Owners of venues who rent out the place for pri vate functions should also be careful to pay more attention to the decorators and other agencies, especially electri cal and pyrotechnics setups.
Between the guests and the decorations, there is a lot of flammable material. Often, you will see open electrical joints to extend a wire, with the potential for a short cir cuit, or the apparent casual ness with which they handle the dangerous CO2 cylinders. The last but not least is the citizen; he bears the brunt but has the least say. How many will walk into a pub or restaurant and make a mental note of the exits? The general tendency in an emergency is to rush to the entrance; this results in crowding and blockage. That is why, in an aircraft, the first briefing is on safe ty and includes a request to locate the other exits based on your seating. When com panies that value safety have a conference, they will have a safety briefing at the start and indicate the exits. In a recent visit for a func tion in a newly built beauti ful hall, it was appalling once inside; the entire wall panel ling was alike, and the only indication of the door was a handle.
If the lights went out in an emergency, no one would find it. There was no glow-in-the-dark indication. Sprinklers or heat detectors were not visible. The door opened out into a narrow passage (less than the rec ommended 1.5 mts), leading to the small lift, and again there were no indications to point to the staircase. The hall was on the top floor. The organisation that hired the hall also did not consider these aspects. People rare ly die because a fire starts. They die because a small fire is allowed to become an ines capable one. Smoke inhalation was the major cause of deaths; hence, visible and clear exits and sprinklers would have played a major role in reduc ing the toll. Safety culture has a long way to go in our country, and we must start today to change it. When citizens begin to demand safe buildings with the same determination that they demand attractive ven ues, owners and regulators alike will have no choice but to respond. That is how safe ty culture begins. (The author prefers to write rather than chat in a balcao)
