Restore the House

The recently concluded winter session of the Parliament has been one of the least productive sessions for both Houses in the last 15 years, as reported by PRS Legislative Research, a New Delhi based think-tank that tracks Parliament. Thanks to the repeated disruptions on the issue of demonetisation of currency, the legislative business that was transacted was the lowest so far since the government was formed in May 2014.
To be sure, both the government and the opposition wanted to debate the issue of demonetisation. The difference arose on the point that whether the House should undertake a debate that should conclude with or without voting. If voting was allowed, it would give an opportunity to the opposition parties to embarrass the government. Conversely since there is no special requirement that mandated a voting debate, there was no reason for the government to agree to one. This might seem like a resolvable point of contention, some would even say silly, yet this difference of opinion became the reason for the session washout. 
Why is it that our Parliament is unable to overcome such basic differences of opinion and help set an agenda that is acceptable to all parties? This is a critical question as we see more and more instances of disruption due to parties unsatisfied with the Parliament’s agenda, rather than differences in policy per se. The reality is that our Parliament is beset with obsolete colonial-era structures with its reliance on consensus than on defined rules for agenda-setting. It is clear that there are structural impediments in our Parliament that need reassessment. Which brings us back to the drawing board – how to decide what to discuss? 
India’s Parliament lacks specific, number-based rules to decide the agenda for discussions, motions, and votes. The present operative word is consensus, and is the prerogative of the House Speaker. This consensus is arrived by the Business Advisory Committee (BAC) which is composed of floor leaders of all the parties. Consistently one finds that the ruling party withholds its consent to admit topics that might embarrass it. Very often, the ruling party agrees to admit plain-vanilla topics that the government can smile away even when pressed hard. What this means is that the consensus requirement essentially gives the government a veto over what can be discussed or voted upon in Parliament. What was originally designed as a veto for the British Viceroy to keep pre-independent India’s parliament in check is now misused in independent India. 
Ironically, most Western democracies don’t follow the consensus-based agenda setting, or at least not anymore, and have rules clearly stipulating the minimum number of legislators required to admit various kinds of debates, motions, and votes. For instance, in the UK, 40 MPs are required to sign to admit a discussion. In the United States, 60 Senators are required to overcome the filibuster, which otherwise permits members to speak endlessly in order to avoid voting on an issue. In India, no number of MPs can demand a voting discussion without the government’s consent. 
It has become obvious that while consensus among the government and opposition parties may have worked in the past, it is simply impractical today. Especially with a House that is represented by 36 different political parties. Not only does the government have a veto on what to discuss, any of the 36 political parties can disagree and break the ‘consensus’. Clearly, the manner of agenda-setting needs a relook. An exception in our Parliament is the rule for no-confidence motions, which are mandatory if demanded in writing by at least 50 Members of Parliament (MP). In this scenario is there no scope for doubt as long as there are a minimum number of MPs that intimate the Speaker to admit this particular motion. Applying the same logic to how all other debates and motions are admitted, would significantly improve our agenda-setting mechanism.
First, introduce non-discretionary rules for voting and non-voting discussions. Recommendations to the tune of minimum 50 MPs’ signatures for a non-voting discussion and 100 MPs’ signatures for a voting discussion have been suggested. Second, introduce a rules-based disciplining of errant MP’s who come to the well of the House to protest. A clear-cut automatic removal of an MP for the day for going into the well for the first time, and for the rest of the session for doing it a second time, would remove the Speaker’s discretion and the ire of his or her colleagues. Third, allocate a few days every session dedicated to discussing issues of the opposition’s choice as in the UK. These straightforward approaches would remove all disagreements around consensus.
We need to recognise even the institution of Parliament needs updating to strengthen its processes. To hold up the progress of an institution’s development with changing times by offering the argument that such suggestions amount to disrespect at best, or contempt at worst, is reductive. In the past we have seen privilege motions being slapped on MPs who have suggested changes in the Parliamentary functioning, including abolishing the Rajya Sabha. These ideas, however unpleasant, must be given the space for a robust debate, including inside Parliament. There is a strong case to reform how the legislature decides what to discuss, and should be the first landmark to cross. A clearly defined non-discretionary and rules-based mechanism for agenda setting is a step in the right direction. Otherwise we are destined to move in circles and experience the same logjams again and again.
(The author is a policy analyst. Follow on Twitter @rohitrrs.)

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