The industry body ASSOCHAM has estimated that Karnataka has suffered a loss of around Rs 22,000-25,000 crore due to the protests and violence in the wake of the Cauvery water dispute. While businesses have been hit and lives disrupted, one must seek to question the fault lines that are arising in our governance structures due to basic resources such as water and the efforts to pre-empt and mitigate future disputes.
While the current focus is on the Cauvery dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, let us not forgot that Goa too has a long pending dispute with Karnataka over the sharing of the water of the Mahadayi or Mandovi river. It was only in July 2016, that the Mahadayi Water Dispute Tribunal (MWDT) gave its interim order that rejected Karnataka’s plea to divert 7.56 tmc water (roughly 2,800 crore litres) for drinking and irrigation purposes in north Karnataka. Life in Karnataka was once again disrupted after pro-Kannada and farmers’ organisations called for a state-wide bandh.
To be sure, each state has a legitimate grievance. Karnataka is facing acute water shortage in its northern districts and Goa has a genuine case in wanting to protect the ecological balance of the river basin. If the demands of either state are reasonable, why is it that we are unable to secure an amicable solution as would two reasonable men who acknowledge and understand the other party’s arguments?
Possibly before one looks at the state governments’ role, the motivation for protests arising from water disputes need to examined. For one, have the channels of communication and negotiation between citizens and government broken down? Stress on drinking water availability is a reality in many parts of our country. One has to question how quickly the various levels of government have responded to water grievances. While it is clear that we must incorporate more sustainable practices in our water management, have the people of north Karnataka been especially let down by the administration in this regard?
Or perhaps the real motive of these protests has little to do with water – more like a playbook to enhance political visibility. Find an issue that concerns a large section of the people (the more basic the need, the better), organise protests around significant developments and pepper with regional jingoism. Thereafter move in to position of power and push the can further down the road, once again leaving behind those in real need of sustainable solutions. In time we will hear about the leaders who were at the forefront of the protests (read: violence) we are witnessing today.
Certainly the above hypotheses are not restricted to water disputes, but a whole gamut of public services offered by the government. A relook at how last-mile citizen-government interacts seems due so that matters do not escalate out of hand.
The second layer that needs to be examined is the institutional structures or mechanism available at the disposal of state governments to resolve water disputes. In the current scenario, State governments can request the Central government to refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. This seems like a reasonable way to resolve a dispute – the decision of the Tribunal has the same force as an order or decree of the Supreme Court.
However issues such as water are sensitive and have shown to escalate tensions quickly. So let’s take a step back and inspect the typical chronology of any water dispute. According to Aaron Wolf, a respected water scholar, one state would unilaterally implement small projects on water within their territory; at some point demand will catch up to supply; and thereafter the state with the natural advantage (source of water within their territory) will announce/implement which impacts at least one of its neighbours.
Our current dispute resolution mechanism kicks in only at the end of the pattern described above. The instances of state governments announcing projects without prior consultation with downstream states is particularly worrying as the engagement begins on a confrontational foot, rather than a plank to mutually solve crucial issues such as drinking water availability. Moreover it induces political opportunists to hold the government to ransom based on the promised projects when verdicts such as MWDT go against them. Our dispute resolution must recognize this and penalise states that use such a tactic.
One way forward can be an early intervention by a notified agency so that conflict does not arise in the future. Using the data on river basins already recorded by the Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India; the agency can map the demand and supply of water from the existing dam/canal infrastructure. The agency monitors the trends and raises red flags based on forecasts whenever demand starts to approach supply. Understandably the model would need to highlight gaps ten to fifteen years in advance, enabling the central government to pre-empt water disputes. Using this data, the central government can bring the concerned state governments on the table to formulate a joint plan of action, both to secure water usage for stressed regions as well as ensure ecological health. The central government can provide attractive financing as a means to incentives collaboration.
Water sharing has always been a contentious issue between states, however it is the increasing and recurrent violence accompanied with them that is assuming worrisome proportions. We must guard against the consequences that arise from escalation of these conflicts. The vision and drive must come from the political stakeholders; derived from dialogue and not political opportunism. In the quest for water security, let us not drown ourselves in conflict.
(The author is a policy analyst. Follow on Twitter @rohitrrs.)
