AAKAR PATEL
On November 4, 2013, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke to over 120 heads of Indian missions and outlined the five principles that defined his foreign policy. These were: First, recognition that In dia’s relations with the world—the ma jor powers and Asian neighbours—were shaped by its developmental priorities. Singh said that ‘the single most impor tant objective of Indian foreign policy has to be to create a global environment conducive to the well-being of our great country’. Second, that greater integration with the world economy would benefit India and enable Indians to realise their crea tive potential. Third, to seek stable, long term and mutually beneficial relations with all major powers. And to work with the international community to create a global economic and security environ ment beneficial to all nations. Fourth, to recognise that the Indian sub continent’s shared destiny required great er regional cooperation and connectivity. Fifth, a foreign policy defined not merely by interests, but also by the values dear to Indians: ‘India’s experiment of pursuing economic development within the frame work of a plural, secular and liberal de mocracy has inspired people around the world and should continue to do so.’ This was a clear exposition of what was sought to be achieved. India would use foreign policy to ad vance its economic development; it would be friendly with global great powers and its neighbours; and it would be helped in doing this by continuing to be a pluralist and secular democracy. I will not go into the present govern ment’s foreign policy principles, mainly because it doesn’t have any. This is not a smear or a casual observation and I have devoted a chapter in a book to ex plain why. It is in fact the case that the foreign minister not only accepts that our policy has no principles; he says that lack of principles is the basis of our policy. In a book of his compiled essays and speeches, he has laid out what he means. What India wanted was a ‘mul ti-polar Asia’ meaning one in which In dia could claim parity with China. He offers no way of doing this, but assumes that we can merely because we desire it to be so. He writes that many balls would need to be kept in the air (Jaishankar has a fond ness for stock phrases) and India would handle them with dexterity. This was op portunism but that was all right because opportunism was India’s culture. The Mahabharata’s lessons, Jaishankar writes, are that deceit and immorality are merely to ‘not play by the rules’. Drona’s demand ing of Eklavya’s thumb, Indra’s appropria tion of Karna’s armour, Arjuna using Shi khandi as a human shield, these were but ‘practices and traditions’. Inconsistency in policy was not only fine but required be cause ‘obsessing about consistency’ made little sense in changing circumstances. Here was a man who could put into words something that was insubstantial and make it sound reasonable. But what was such a doctrine to be called? In a speech he made where he first laid out this doctrine of opportunism and incon sistency, Jaishankar said it is hard to give it a name. He takes up and discards the phrases — ‘multi-alignment’ (‘sounds too opportunistic’) and ‘India first’ (‘sounds self-centred’). He settles at ‘advancing prosperity and influence’, which he says is accurate but admits is not catchy. He believes some name for it will eventually come if it is pursued long enough, because part of the challenge is that we are still in the early phase of a major transition. This was published some time ago, in the second term of this government. The world as we can see all around us, has changed. It has become uncertain and it has turned dangerous, especially for na tions that are dependent, as we are, for energy and for external employment, es pecially in the Gulf. US President Donald Trump has of fered no real reason for starting this third American Gulf War and has articulated no real aims that he wants achieved besides tactical ones. The minister handling America’s de fence department appears totally un hinged and incompetent in his press briefings. How the war will conclude is not known to anyone because Iran has a say in how and when it will end. Israel’s involvement in the attack makes this war particularly alarming because it unlike America cannot just cut and run, since it is part of the region and armed with nu clear weapons. What is to be done by India in this time and what is the policy to be adopt ed? Perhaps we will get by through what Jaishankar is saying we should do. And looking at what we are doing seems clear that we have proceeded along the lines of opportunism. Hours before the war, with an armada in place, we flew to Tel Aviv to receive a medal, endorsing what was to come. We have shied away from condemna tion of State assassinations, of the mass murder of schoolgirls and the murder of sailors without a declaration of war. Where we see opportunity, such as getting a couple of tankers out, we will take it. We have no role in the larger making of peace or reestablishment of a rules-based order because our creed is opportunism and that means not shaping the world but taking short term advantage where we can. Perhaps this will work, but equally it might not. And for this reason, we should going back to first principles. Reconsider ing what Manmohan Singh said about In dia’s external policy, what it was intended to achieve and for what reason is a good start. (Aakar Patel is a writer and columnist)
