John S. Shilshi
Even in wildest of dreams, no one would have ever imagined that terror act could be reported from a peaceful and happening city like Mumbai. But this general perception was proved wrong when in 2008, the worst-ever terrorist attack was witnessed. Besides loss of many lives, including 16 policemen, several iconic landmarks of Mumbai were attacked. The incident which continued for sixty plus hours sent chill down the spines of not only Indians, but to the world at large. Expectedly, the gruesome attack generated great deal of debate about the capability of the Mumbai police in tackling incidents of such natures.
Whether or not the Mumbai police could have prevented the incident, or could the situation been handled differently shall remain matter of academic interest without actually throwing up the desired answer. It is also likely that the incident would be discussed as a case study in all class rooms of counter-insurgency and combating terrorism.
True to our nature of being a reactive nation rather than a pre-emptive one, the Mumbai police today is better prepared and organised to ensure that no second surprise takes place. In other words, 26/11 triggered the need to be prepared as such. Among many reasons behind why 26/11 took place, Mumbai being a peaceful city was one of them. While the city was well known for rampant overt and overt activities of the underworld gangs, it seldom was exposed to incidents perpetrated by terror organisations, militants and insurgency activities unlike Kashmir or some of the states of North east India.
Therefore, the habit to anticipate and remain prepared unfortunately was missing. Instead, the avoidable sense of complacency and attitude of taking things for granted led to ignoring even some intelligence inputs about a possible attack, though the golden rule says that not input, even rumours, having significant bearing should be discounted. In a way, this was the price Mumbai had to pay for being a peaceful city.
Therefore, in the event of groups deciding to go peripheral to such undisturbed, unhindered and unsuspecting territories, a state like Goa is more vulnerable in comparison to others. The presence of sizeable foreign tourists at any given point of time would be a motivation, and even if Mumbai magnitude of damage may not be achieved, targeting a group of foreign tourists or their place of stay would make enough news to draw the attention of the international community.
Secondly, the coastal areas of neighbouring Karnataka, so also Kerala have in recently years witnessed exponential surge in activities of fundamentalist organizations. Therefore, outfits espousing similar ideology could provide the necessary launching pad and also facilitate post-offensive retreat.
Another area of concern for Goa is the moving population along the highway. There are small time service providers of all hues, running business from make-shift sheds and huts, the antecedents of which, one suspects are not known to the authorities. Experience will tell us that these category of people in the social strata are most vulnerable to being lured by money, and they may well be tempted to take advantage of the seeming absence of monitoring and vigilance. There is a need for some kind of unobtrusive vetting of incoming work force by the police and other concerned authorities to convey the message that eyes are on them.
