BLAISE COSTABIR
The Foreign Contribu tion (Regulation) Act, or FCRA, was first enact ed in 1976. Its original pur pose was straightforward: to prevent foreign money from influencing India’s politics, elections, public servants, the media, and civil society in ways that could compromise nation al sovereignty. Few would dis pute that any sovereign nation has the right to guard itself against external interference. In 2010, the law was re written using a more modern framework. The emphasis shifted toward transparency, accountability, and the law ful use of foreign funds. NGOs could receive contributions after registration, spending had to match approved pur poses, and reporting require ments became stricter. At least in principle, the law sought to regulate foreign funding rather than prohibit it. The 2020 amendment marked a sharper turn. Com pliance requirements in creased significantly. Trans fers between FCRA-registered organisations were prohib ited. All foreign funds had to pass through a designated SBI branch in New Delhi. Adminis trative expenses were capped at 20 percent, down from 50 percent earlier. Registration, renewal and monitoring be came more centralised, with stronger enforcement powers and higher compliance bur dens. Now comes the proposed 2026 amendment, currently held in abeyance after political opposition from several quar ters, including Kerala, where concerns have been strongly voiced. Critics argue that it represents the most significant shift yet: from the regulation of funds to control over assets created through those funds. Under the proposed frame work, failure to renew regis tration on time could result in “deemed cessation.” Assets created from foreign contribu tions may then be taken over by a yet-to-be-defined Desig nated Authority. Such assets could continue to be operated, or even sold, with proceeds transferred to the India Fund. Supporters may call this ac countability. Opponents see it as an extraordinary state pow er over institutions built over decades without state funding or state management. This debate is not theoreti cal. India has already seen the impact of FCRA enforcement. Amnesty International India halted operations after its ac counts were frozen in 2020. The Ford Foundation faced regulatory restrictions and in creased scrutiny. The Mission aries of Charity temporarily lost renewal of registration in 2021 before it was later re stored. In each case, the law did not remain a matter of pa perwork—it directly affected institutions, staff, beneficiar ies, and public trust. Supporters of FCRA argue that these measures protect sovereignty, transparency, and the lawful use of foreign mon ey. Critics warn that selective or excessive enforcement can shrink civil society space and weaken independent institu tions. Yet an important question remains. If the law exists to protect India from harmful foreign influence, why is there so little public record of major NGOs being convicted in court for anti-national activity under FCRA? Most enforcement ap pears to occur not through ju dicial findings, but through ad ministrative powers: freezing accounts, denying renewals, suspending registrations, and imposing restrictions. Those powers may be lawful, but they are not the same as conviction after an open trial and tested evidence. Another consequence often overlooked in this debate is the effect on ordinary citizens who are far removed from politics. Many NGOs are not advocacy bodies at all. They run hostels, palliative care centres, disa bility services, de-addiction programmes, village schools, women’s shelters, skill training centres, and nutrition projects. When funding is abruptly fro zen or registration is denied, it is not only trustees or admin istrators who suffer. The first impact is usually felt by the poor, the elderly, children, pa tients, and communities with no alternative support system and definitely no Government assistance. In Goa, too, where schools, homes, and charitable institu tions have long supplemented public welfare, such questions are not abstract. The cross-sec tion of citizens has voiced its opposition, and the umbrella body, the Catholic Association of Goa, has appealed to the President of India to stop the passing of the bill. The State may argue that genuine organisations can al ways comply and continue. In theory, that is fair. In practice, compliance failures are not always the same as malicious intent. Delayed filings, proce dural mistakes, interpretation disputes, or technical lapses should not automatically invite consequences severe enough to cripple public service in stitutions built over decades. Compliance requires capaci ties that many smaller NGOs do not possess, as their focus is on service delivery rather than regulatory administration. There is also a practical governance question. If the government acquires powers over assets such as schools, hospitals, homes, and wel fare centres, does it have the administrative capacity, local trust, and specialised expertise to run them better? If not, take over may satisfy regulation on paper while weakening service delivery on the ground. Strong states do not fear in dependent institutions. They regulate them fairly, punish genuine wrongdoing firmly, and allow honest organisa tions to function freely. That balance is the real test of dem ocratic confidence. This brings us to the issue of due process. When registra tion is denied or cancelled, the reasons are often broad, confi dential, or unavailable for pub lic scrutiny. In some cases, in telligence inputs are cited but not disclosed. There may be valid national security reasons for confidentiality. But where institutions running schools, hospitals, homes, and welfare services are affected, fairness demands some meaningful av enue of independent review. A law designed to enforce transparency cannot itself operate through opaque deci sions. The proposed 2026 amend ment raises this concern fur ther because it extends con sequences beyond funding to assets. If the state seeks power to take over or dispose of property created by private charitable effort, then proce dural safeguards must become stronger, not weaker. At the very least, denial, cancellation, or takeover decisions should be challengeable before an independent judicial forum within clear timelines. There is also a deeper politi cal layer to the present debate. When public figures link FCRA with anti-conversion laws, the discussion moves beyond ac counting compliance into the contested terrain of faith, iden tity, and State power. That may energise politics, but it risks weakening trust in regulatory institutions. The Goa Government must impress upon the Centre to re consider the amendment and engage stakeholders before constitutional freedoms are compromised. India must regulate foreign funding, but regulation with out fairness becomes control. Otherwise, a law created to protect sovereignty may begin to erode another democratic value: the freedom of civil so ciety to function without fear. That is the real question before India today: where should reg ulation end, and control begin? (The author prefers to write rather than chat in a balcao)
