Team Herald
PANJIM: The fact-finding committee investigating the tragic stampede during the annual zatra at the Shree Lairai Devi temple, in which six devotees lost their lives and over 70 were injured, has held the temple committee, district administration, district police, Shirgao village panchayat, and the crowd collectively responsible. The committee, which also observed that the tragedy was entirely preventable, has recommended a detailed inquiry and the establishment of accountability.
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In its 26-page report, the four-member committee emphasised the need to fix individual responsibility and implement corrective and disciplinary measures to prevent future tragedies. It found that the temple committee, district administration, police, and panchayat failed to learn from past incidents or take adequate precautions to avoid such mishaps.
Making the report public on Tuesday, Chief Minister Pramod Sawant stated that the government has issued show-cause notices to eight officers concerned for the lapses – the then North Goa Collector Sneha Gitte, the then SP North Akshat Kaushal, the then Bicholim Deputy Collector and SDM Bhimnath Khorjuvenkar, the then Bicholim DySP Jivba Dalvi, the then Bicholim PI Dinesh Gadekar, the then Mopa PI Naryan Chimulkar, the then Bicholim Mamlatdar Abhijit Gaonkar and Shirgao panchayat secretary Sanjay Parab.
The committee conducted site visits, consulted stakeholders, and reviewed administrative records.
It concluded that the incident was entirely preventable and resulted from poor planning, lack of enforcement, ignored directives, and inadequate infrastructure.
The immediate cause of the stampede, according to the report, was overcrowding on the pathway between Devichi Tali (holy pond) and Homkhand (ritual bonfire), particularly at the upper section of the sloped gradient near the RBL Bank branch in Shirgao. This was worsened by the unruly behaviour of the dhonds (devotees) and a lack of effective crowd control measures.
The crowd was allowed to enter the pathway from Tali in groups, which were later funnelled into a two-by-two queue formation after the slope. This caused a bottleneck, with people accumulating along the sloped section. The situation escalated when some dhonds pushed forward through the crowd, causing instability and panic. One person reportedly fell face-first on the slope, triggering a chain reaction in which several others lost their balance and fell. Due to the slope, poor visibility, and continued crowd pressure from behind, others were unaware of the fall, leading to the fatal stampede.
The committee stated that the tragedy could likely have been averted with proper planning, risk assessment, and effective crowd management. It also noted that unruly and irresponsible behaviour by a section of dhonds significantly contributed to the overcrowding. Despite this behaviour being well known, neither the temple committee nor the administration took tangible preventive measures — possibly due to sensitivities around religious sentiments.
The report highlights the temple committee’s failure to plan meticulously, especially considering the expected crowd size and behaviour. Even though multiple alternate routes existed, no multi-route circulation plan was implemented, leading to heavy congestion along the primary pathway.
A review of pre-event meeting minutes revealed that the temple committee did not provide critical information about expected attendance, past risks, or alternative routes. Moreover, the committee appeared to have ignored specific crowd management instructions from revenue and police officials, focusing solely on conducting religious rituals.
The committee also found that temporary stalls, despite warnings from authorities, were allowed to operate on both sides of the pathway. This significantly reduced available space, further worsening the crowd situation. The organisers were fully aware of this issue but failed to take preventive steps.
One of the committee’s strongest recommendations is that the government consider dissolving the current temple management committee and appointing an administrator, following due legal process.
The report also pointed out that while CCTV cameras had been installed within the temple premises, surveillance was not extended to high-risk external areas, including the sloped section — known for overcrowding and disorderly crowd movement.
Administrative meetings lacked meaningful capacity planning and risk assessment, especially during the peak ritual hours from 11 pm on May 2 to 6 am on May 3, 2025. Although the District Magistrate visited the site on April 29, no coordination meeting was convened at their level to comprehensively assess preparedness, despite the scale of the event.
While it had been mentioned that six watch towers would be installed, the committee found — based on interaction with the Bicholim Police Inspector — that the tower near the sloped section was never erected. Furthermore, the two constables assigned to that area had been redeployed elsewhere.
The police had also deployed a drone for surveillance, but it was not used during the critical hours. The reasons for this remain unclear.
Chief Minister Sawant announced that, moving forward, the government will appoint special nodal officers responsible for granting permissions and ensuring proper planning and safety measures at all zatras, in coordination with respective temple committees.
