ith the term of the Mhadei Water Dispute Tribunal (MWDT) being extended by another year recently, Goa has some breathing space to reflect on where its battle for River Mhadei has reached so far and ponder over the future strategy. The task cannot be of the present government alone, which incidentally is facing the brunt of politics played out over the issue by previous regimes, but the civil society-non State actors too need to rethink on their role if Goa’s interests have to be best protected. It is quite clear that the agency of politics in the present matter has been the biggest disadvantage for Goa, and therefore the approach has to cut across the political domain and border on power of argument and reason backed by claims of equity and justice.
It was quite evident in the early years of the Mhadei river dispute that Goa’s argument, bordering on principles of equity, ecology and justice would have to be supplemented with scientific data and realistic estimate of its potential hydrological requirements. At the same time, the need was to have created a dialogue mechanism, where constituents within Karnataka could have been engaged on exploring alternatives and tapping existing groundwater resources. Goa’s insistence on the creation of a Tribunal early on limited the scope of any such mediation. What ideally should have been a dialogue between the States actually became dialogue within the States, where respective political parties made it an issue of competitive politics shaped by electoral concerns several times. Finally the Mhadei Tribunal delivered in 2018 an award of water-sharing – as any tribunal would do – which has been challenged by all the three States.
While it is not the time to ponder over what could have been done best (and there are plenty of things to point out if one looks at the detailed verdict) the question remains, is there a way forward, other than merely expecting the Supreme Court to consider Goa’s contempt plea on Karnataka’s going ahead with the diversion? If so, can there be a realistic expectation that Goa can still retrieve something out of what remains. There are three probable pointers in this direction, bordering on the legal, political and the civil society. All the three would have to work in tandem with each other with a coordinated strategy and has its own inherent challenges.
On the legal side, as the MWDT verdict now constitutes a decisive document for reference, for court as well as the governments, a re-reading of the verdict from a technical standpoint is most important. The Tribunal very clearly observes that it is unable to apportion equitable claims between the three States ‘in the absence of appropriate information and data provided by them to judge their individual claims over water and that the ‘demand for future projection of water provided by the states is not justified in the absence of scientific and ecological studies’. Goa must take a fresh look at its legal submissions and try to fill in the gaps if any, so that its case becomes more grounded on scientific data. Another important part of this exploration must be a deeper study of the alternatives that could be suggested to the neighbouring State, tapping the studies done on Malprabha basin.
The bigger challenge is on the political side, where odds have been heavily pitted against Goa, given its small size and hence a smaller political voice that could resonate with the Centre, given the might of numbers on the other side. It is one thing to argue a matter in a court of law, but it is a different ballgame, when matters are decided in corridors of political power. It is in this context, the opposition and the government must come together and display a bipartisan consensus so that the government is able to push its case both at the political and the bureaucratic level at the Centre, identifying the pro-Goa voices in Delhi, which one is sure still exist. Goa must seek a new framework for the treatment of smaller States in India, which cannot be judged by the same parameters as big States and Mhadei sensitisation could be first step in this direction. This certainly is going to be a tall order given the way Centre State politics is currently playing out in India, but would be an effort worth trying.
Last but not the least, is the need for a different kind of a civil society engagement with Karnataka, particularly at the ground zero of the current dispute. There is a need to engage with the diverse civil society actors from across the State ranging from environmentalists, farmers, academicians and all those who have a stake. It is quite obvious that this cannot be a one off event, but a series in which first there could be a presentation of respective concerns and then possibilities of exploring some meeting points where greater space could be created for understanding Goa’s concerns. Advantages of such interactions would be that there would be greater flexibility to explore out of the box solutions as it would emerge from a collective deliberation. Both the sides may have to shun their original positions, which if taken forward in a logical manner could be presented as a joint civil society input to the Tribunal/Potential Mhadei Authority as and when it comes up. The least such an initiative could do is build a bridge of trust which could play the role of stabilizer when inter-state tempers run high and avoid unnecessary acrimony between the two states that have deep historical/cultural/economic connections.
Goa has already reached a stage where it is running out of options on the Mhadei issue. A recalibration of its strategy on the above lines, may perhaps help it to recover some lost ground and write a new template for the State in the national imagination. There is much at stake for this option to be exercised sooner rather than later.
(The author teaches Political Science at Goa University)

